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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNT~-:;c. ,._ ... __ ._ ... _ ._ . _'_ '_"~ 
STATE OF GEORGIA ~ IN OFfiCE! 
ALLEN FREEMAN, BARBARA) I APR -; 2009 1 
FREEMAN, NELDA FREEMAN, and ) . 
LOIS MEISER V. VISION) , OEPOiYClERKSUPERIORCOURi -
) !J=_'?"fq~ION COUNTY. GA, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
VISION FINANCIAL, LP, 
TRADESTATION SECURITIES, INC., 
MF GLOBAL INC., f/k/a MAN 
FINANCIAL INC., ANTHONY 
MICHAEL RAMUNNO, JR., 
individually and d/b/a RENAISSANCE 
ASSET MANAGEMENT, RAM I, LLC, 
RENAISSANCE ASSET 
MANAGEMENT, LLC, and WILLIAM 
STACY WILKINSON 
Defendants, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Civil Action File No. 2007CV138599 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
On March 16, 2009, counsel for the parties appeared to present oral argument on Motions 
to Dismiss filed by Vision Financial Markets, LLC ("Vision"), TradeStation Securities, Inc. 
("TradeStation"), and MF Global, Inc. ("MF," collectively the "FCM Defendants"). After 
reviewing the Complaint, the briefs submitted on the Motions, and the oral arguments presented 
by counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
I. FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 
Defendant Michael Ramunno, Jr.l is currently incarcerated for operating fraudulent 
investment schemes. Mr. Ramunno created isolated investments for and managed an 
unregistered commodity pool which he operated as a Ponzi scheme using new investments to pay 
"returns". In addition, Defendant Ramunno allegedly perpetrated his scheme by circulating 
1 Defendant Michael Ramunno Jr., was served with the Complaint on August 16,2007. He has 
not filed an Answer with the Court. 
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fictitious monthly account statements, 2004 and 2005 Annual Reports with fake "audited" 
financial statements, and a Private Placement Memorandum ("PPM") in 2005 with false return 
summaries and account descriptions. 
Plaintiffs,2 along with many other individuals not named in this lawsuit, invested their 
money with Defendant Ramunno. Defendant Ramunno perpetrated his scheme through three 
entities created and controlled by him: Renaissance Asset Management ("Asset Management"),3 
Renaissance Asset Management LLC ("Renaissance"),4 and RAM I, LLC ("RAM").s 
Defendant William Stacy Wilkinson, a licensed securities and commodities broker, worked with 
Ramunno as an officer and owner of Renaissance and RAM. 
In September, 2008, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to name three futures commodity 
merchants as Defendants: Vision,6 TradeStation,7 and MF.8 Plaintiffs bring five counts against 
the FCM Defendants: (1) fraud/conspiracy to defraud, (2) constructive fraud and negligent 
2 Plaintiffs Allen and Barbara Freeman invested the following amounts with Ramunno: $450,000 
in July, 2004; $135,000 in November, 2004; and $700,000 in November, 2005. Plaintiff Nelda 
Freeman, mother to Allen Freeman, invested the following amounts with Ramunno: $200,000 in 
November, 2004. Plaintiff Lois Meiser, mother to Barbara Freeman, invested the following 
amounts with Ramunno: $40,000 in February, 2005. 
3 Asset Management was an unregistered and unlicensed commodity pool operator and trading 
advisor that operated from 2003-2005 accepting cash from investors, including Plaintiffs. Asset 
Management was operated as a sole proprietorship. 
4 Renaissance is a Georgia limited liability company created in 2005. In July, 2005, Renaissance 
submitted a registration application with the Nations Futures Association ("NF A") and became a 
registered commodity pool operator and trading advisor. 
S RAM is Delaware limited liability company created in 2005. 
6 Ramunno/ Asset Management opened an account in 2003 with Vision as Ramunno d/b/a 
Renaissance Asset Management. 
7 Ramunno/ Asset Management opened an account with Trade Station in May, 2004 under the 
name "Renaissance Asset Management." In opening the account, Ramunno filled out an account 
application (attached to the TradeStation Answer) stating that Ramunno was self-employed and 
asserting that all funds are/will be "personal funds" and none are or were to be solicited from a 
third party. 
8 Ramunno submitted an account application in 2005 with MF and attached a copy of the PPM. 
Unlike with the other FCM Defendants, at the time that Ramunno opened the MF account, 
Renaissance/RAM was a properly registered commodity pool. 
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misrepresentation, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, 
and (5) negligence. Plaintiffs allege that the FMC Defendants failed to investigate 
Ramunno/Renaissance when opening and maintaining the accounts and should have discovered 
that the commodity pool was unregistered from 2003-2005 and that it was engaged in fraudulent 
activity. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the FCM Defendants failed to segregate funds in the 
accounts. 
II. STANDARD 
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b )(6), the Court must 
determine whether plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under this 
standard, the Court must grant the motion if"(l) the allegations of the complaint disclose with 
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts 
asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly 
introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the 
relief sought." Stendahl v. Cobb Cty., 284 Ga. 525, 525 (2008). 
III. ARGUMENTS 
A. Duty Owed by FCM Defendants to Plaintiffs 
The FCM Defendants argue that Plaintiffs were not their customers, and therefore, they 
did not owe Plaintiffs any duty for purposes of establishing fraud through omission, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, or negligence. The FCM Defendants assert that 
Plaintiffs were customers ofRamunno, that Ramunno was a customer of the FCM Defendants, 
but that there was no customer relationship between the FCM Defendants and Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs argue that they are the beneficial owners of the pooled accounts, and therefore, 
are "customers" ofthe FCM Defendants. Plaintiffs rely upon case law interpreting the definition 
of "customers" in the context of compulsory arbitration with securities brokers under NASD 
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rules, which holds that a "customer" is not limited to account holders ofFCM defendants. See 
~, WMA Securities, Inc. v. Wynn, 191 F.R.D. 128, 130 (S.D. OH 1999) ("A Customer is 
defined as anyone who is not a broker or dealer. 'Customer' is not [solely] defined ... as a person 
who opened an account with a brokerage firm). The cases cited by Plaintiffs, however, are 
inapplicable because in each case cited, the non-account holder who was found to be a 
"customer" had contact with and, at a minimum, an "informal business relationship" with a 
registered representative ofthe defendant securities broker. See, e.g., Multi-Financial Securities 
Corp. v. King, 386 F.3d 1364, 1368-71 (lIth Cir. 2004) (holding that an investor who relied 
upon firm's registered representative and firm's reputation is a "customer" pursuant to NASD 
rules); Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 1995); Vextax 
Securities Corp. v. McWood, 116 F. Supp.2d 865,869-870 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Vextax Securities 
Corp. v. Skillman, 117 F. Supp.2d 654,657 (N.D. OH 2000); WMA Securities Inc. v. Ruppert, 
80 F. Supp.2d. 786 (S.D. OH 1999). 
Here, the NASD rules are not applicable. In addition, Plaintiffs have not alleged any 
communication, contact, or any other fact giving rise to a customer relationship, whether formal 
(i.e., an account) or informal (i.e., investment advice), between them and the FCM Defendants. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs' reliance on NASD rules and case law interpreting a broker's fiduciary 
duties owed to its customers is misplaced. It is undisputed that brokers owe specific duties to 
customers such as a care and loyalty, but there is no allegation in the Complaint sufficient to 
impute such a duty on the FCM Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs. 
Even if the FCM Defendants owed no fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs argue that the 
FCM Defendants had a duty under Section 4( d)(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"), 
and the accompanying CFTC regulations, to account separately for all of Plaintiffs' funds and 
not to commingle or pool such funds. The commodity pool is the "customer" under Section 
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4( d)(2), not the individual investors. The FCM Defendants were under no duty to account to the 
individual investors participating in the pool; rather, it was the duty of the commodity pool 
operator to provide such an accounting. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d, 6n(4). 
Finally, Plaintiffs rely upon common law principles of agency to establish a duty owed to 
them by the FCM Defendants. See e.g., Webb v. Day, 273 Ga. App. 491, 492 (2005) ("Agency 
is the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that 
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." ); 
O.e.G.A. § 23-2-58 ("Any relationship shall be deemed confidential ... where one party is so 
situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another 
.... "). The Complaint in this case, however, is devoid of any allegation that the FCM Defendants 
exerted control over Plaintiffs or the non-discretionary accounts that Ramunno opened with the 
FCM Defendants on behalf of the Plaintiffs. 
In all of the theories advanced and cases relied upon by Plaintiffs, there is a connection 
between the brokerage firm and the investors to whom a duty arises. That crucial link is missing 
in this case. The facts of this case are analogous to the facts of Kolbeck v. LIT America, Inc., 
923 F. Supp. 557,563 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) where the plaintiffs brought negligence, fraud, and 
breach of fiduciary duty claims against futures commodity merchants who opened accounts for 
an unregistered commodity pool into which plaintiffs had invested. The Kolbeck court 
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint finding that the futures commodity merchant defendants owed no 
duty to plaintiffs. "Securities brokers do not owe a general duty of care or disclosure to the 
public simply because they are market professionals. A duty of care arises only when the broker 
does business with the plaintiffs." Id. at 572. The defendants in Kolbeck gave monthly tours of 
the New York Futures trading floors to potential investors in the unregistered pool, including the 
plaintiffs in the case. The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments that those tours were sufficient to 
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create a confidential relationship or a duty between the parties. Id. at 561. Here, Plaintiffs have 
not alleged a single instance of contact or communication between them and the FCM 
Defendants. Without facts to support the claim that the FCM Defendants "did business" with 
Plaintiffs, there is no basis upon which to find that the FCM Defendants owed a duty to 
Plaintiffs. See also, Damato v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 878 F. Supp. 1156, 1158-
1162 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (dismissing claims against FCM defendants because liability under the 
CEA only extends to those who sold investments in the commodity pool and similarly dismissing 
fraud claims); Brown v. Royce Brokerage, Inc., 632 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1980) (dismissing fraud, 
breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence claims against FCM defendants because there is no duty 
to investigate registration status and because plaintiffs were not "customers" of the FCM). 
As a matter oflaw, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are not customers of the FCM 
Defendants, and therefore, the FCM Defendants owed no duties to Plaintiffs. 
The absence of a duty owed to Plaintiffs by the FCM Defendants necessitates dismissal 
of the fraud by fraudulent omission claim in Count I, constructive fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation claims in Count II, breach of fiduciary duty claim in Count III, and negligence 
claims in Count v. See, Ades v. Werther, 256 Ga. App. 8, 11 (2002) (fraud); O.C.G.A. § 23-2-
51 (constructive fraud); Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., 267 Ga. 
424,426 (1997) (negligent misrepresentation); Perry Golf Course Dev. LLC v. Housing 
Authority of City of Atlanta, 294 Ga. App. 387,393 (2008) (breach of fiduciary duty); Bradley 
Center v. Wessner. 250 Ga. 199,200 (1982) (negligence). 
B. Conspiracy to Defraud 
Plaintiffs allege that the FCM Defendants participated in a conspiracy to defraud 
Plaintiffs. In order to demonstrate a conspiracy, Plaintiffs must show that the FCM Defendants 
acted in concert with Ramunno and Wilkerson to "accomplish an unlawful end or to accomplish 
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a lawful end by unlawful means." First Federal Sav. Bank v. Hart, 185 Ga. App. 304, 
305 (1987). The Complaint alleges that the FCM Defendants knew or were extremely reckless 
in not knowing that Asset Management was an unregistered commodity pool operator,9 that 
Ramunno, Wilkinson, the Asset Management/Renaissance entities made false statements to 
investors, and that the PPM contained false and fraudulent misrepresentations. Taking Plaintiffs' 
allegations as true, there is nothing in the Complaint, however, to sustain allegations that the 
FCM Defendants acted in concert with Ramunno, Wilkinson, or the Asset 
Management/Renaissance entities in order to defraud Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs merely allege 
knowledge, which is not conspiracy. Having previously held that the FCM Defendants had no 
duty to disclose information, conspiracy to defraud must also be dismissed in the absence of 
factual allegations to support the existence of such a conspiracy. 
c. Aiding and Abetting 
Plaintiffs allege that the FCM Defendants aided and abetted Defendant Ramunno's 
breach of his fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs. To establish a claim of aiding and abetting, one 
must show that "(1) through improper action or wrongful conduct and without privilege, the 
defendant acted to procure a breach of the primary wrongdoer's fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; (2) 
with knowledge that the primary wrongdoer owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty, the defendant 
acted purposely and with malice and the intent to injure; (3) the defendant's wrongful conduct 
procured a breach of the primary wrongdoer's fiduciary duty; and (4) the defendant's tortious 
conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff." Insight Technology, Inc. v. FreightCheck, 
LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19,25-26 (2006) (citations omitted). Count IV of the Complaint closely 
follows the language of Insight in alleging aiding and abetting. The language of the Complaint 
9 This claim in inapplicable to Defendant MF Global, Inc., because Asset 
Management/Renaissance was registered at the time that Rarnunno opened an account with this 
Defendant. 
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states that the FCM Defendants acted purposefully and with malice and the intent to injure, but 
the Complaint is devoid of any allegation to support such a legal conclusion. "While the 
complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it must contain more than a formulaic 
recitation ofthe elements of a legal cause of action." Charles H. Wesley Educ. Foundation, Inc. 
v. State Election Bd., 282 Ga. 707, 714 (2007); see also, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 
(1986) (on a motion to dismiss, a court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched 
as a factual allegation"). Without a factual allegation of malice or intent to injure, the Court 
must dismiss Plaintiffs' claim of aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. See Kolbeck v. 
LIT America, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) affd 153 F.3d 918 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(affirming dismissal ofFCM defendants on aiding and abetting claims). 
D. Punitive Damages & Attorneys Fees 
Without the underlying counts in this action, Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages and 
attorneys' fees must also be dismissed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court hereby GRANTS the FCM Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and ORDERS that 
they be dismissed with prejUdice. 
SO ORDERED this ,;2~y of April, 2009. 
ETH E. LONG, SENIOR E 
Superi r Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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Coples to: 
Attornc:ys for Plaintiffs 
Jason R. Doss, Esq. 
Joy L. Doss, Esq. 
The Doss Firm 
P.O. Box 965669 
Marietta, Georgia 30066 
770/578-1314 
jasondoss@dossfinn.com. 
joydoss@dossfirm.com 
Attorn~s for Defendants 
Vision Financial LP 
Steven Dubner, Esq. 
Higgins & Dubner 
3333 Peachtree Road, NE 
Suite 230 
Atlanta, Georgia 30326 
404/264-1011 
sdubncr@higdub.com 
Kenneth F. Berg 
Ulmer & Berne ILP 
One N. Franklin, Suite 1825 
Chicago, IL 60606 
(312) 324-8006 
kberg@ulmer.com 
MF Global Inc. 
Harold T. Daniel, Jr., Esq. 
Kelli S. Lott, Esq. 
Holland & Knight LLP 
One Atlantic Center, Suite 2000 
1201 West Peachtree Street, NE 
Atlanta, GA 30309 
404/817-8500 
harold.danicl@hklaw.co111 
kclli.lott@hklaw.com 
Of counsel 
Therese M. Doherty, Esq. 
Herrick Feinstein LLP 
2 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10016 
TradeStation Securities Inc. 
Jeffrey W. Willis, Esq. 
Rogers & Hardin LLP 
2700 International Tower, Peachtree Center 
229 Peachtree Street, NE 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
404/522-4700 
j\villis@rh-law.com 
William G. Leonard, Esq. 
Taylor, English Duma, LLP 
1600 Parkwood Circle, Suite 200 
Atlanta, GA 30339 
(678) 336-7162 
bleonard@taylor-busch.com 
Anthony Michael Ramunno,Jr. 
Federal Correctional Institute Ashland 
P.O. Box 6001 
Ashland, Kentucky, 41105 
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